Wiki source code of Definitions
Version 6.1 by Zenna Elfen on 2025/11/27 12:13
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1.1 | 1 | == Definitions for Authentication and Access == |
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3.1 | 3 | (% border="1" dir="ltr" id="auth_def" style="margin-right:auto" summary="Definitions for Authentication and Access" %) |
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1.1 | 4 | |=Function|=What it means in P2P context |
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2.1 | 5 | |Permissions|//Define what actions a peer is allowed to perform (read, write, broadcast, modify state, etc.)// |
| 6 | |Delegation|//Allow a peer to grant some portion of its authority to another peer (e.g., "you can write to this dataset for 1 day")// | ||
| 7 | |Capabilities|//Tokens/objects that embody permissions and can be passed around securely// | ||
| 8 | |Revocation|//Ability to withdraw access (essential yet tricky, since there's no central admin)// | ||
| 9 | |Identity-agnostic control|//Often operations are authorized not by who you are but what capabilities you possess// | ||
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5.1 | 13 | == == |
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| 15 | == == | ||
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| 17 | == == | ||
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| 19 | == == | ||
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| 21 | == == | ||
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1.1 | 23 | == Definitions for Security and Encryption == |
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4.1 | 25 | (% border="1" dir="ltr" id="sec_def" style="margin-right:auto" summary="Definitions for Security and Encryption" %) |
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1.1 | 26 | |=Security Function|=Purpose|=Examples |
| 27 | |Transport Encryption|//P2P channel confidentiality//|//TLS, Noise// | ||
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6.1 | 28 | |[[Private Interest Overlap>>https://willowprotocol.org/specs/pio/index.html#private_interest_overlap]]|//allows peers to securely determine if they have capabilities in common without revealing what those capabilities are//|//Willow// |
| 29 | |[[Prefix Pruning>>https://willowprotocol.org/specs/data-model/index.html#prefix_pruning]]|Enables removal of data by replacing data with a new timestamped file that is empty, encouraging replication of the deletion. "you have a path hierarchy which lets you prune off a whole bunch of leaves by cutting at the root. Like if you replaced your Documents directory with a text file of the same name."|//Willow// | ||
| 30 | |Message" Encryption|//End-to-end secrecy, async//|//MLS, Olm/Megolm, DR// | ||
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1.1 | 31 | |Identity & Trust|//Who’s who, key bootstrapping//|//DIDs, TOFU, Web-of-trust// |
| 32 | |Integrity|//Detect tampering//|//AEAD, Merkle DAGs// | ||
| 33 | |Key Lifecycle|//Rotation, revocation, recovery//|//X3DH, key transparency// | ||
| 34 | |Anonymity & Metadata Protection|//Hide who communicates with whom//|//Tor, mixnets// | ||
| 35 | |Anti-Abuse / Sybil Resistance|//Resist spam and capture//|//PoW, stake, identity proofs// | ||
| 36 | |Censorship Resistance|//Survive blocking, surveillance//|//pluggable transports, relays// | ||
| 37 | |Secure Storage|//Protect data at rest//|//hardware keystores, secret sharing// | ||
| 38 | |Integrated Overlays|//All of the above in one stack//|//Veilid, I2P, Nym// | ||
| 39 | |Confidentiality|//Only intended peers can read communication//|//TLS, DTLS, Noise Protocol Framework, AEAD (e.g., ChaCha20-Poly1305), MLS, Olm/Megolm, WireGuard, Veilid E2E channels// | ||
| 40 | |Integrity|//Messages can't be modified undetected//|//Digital signatures (Ed25519, BLS), MACs, Merkle DAGs (IPLD/IPFS), Hash chains, Signed Gossip, BPSec// | ||
| 41 | |Authentication|//Verify identity or cryptographic key ownership//|//Noise handshake patterns, TLS mutual auth, DIDs, Web-of-Trust (PGP), TOFU (SSH-style), libp2p PeerIDs, X3DH (Signal)// | ||
| 42 | |Forward Secrecy|//Compromising long-term keys does not reveal past messages//|//Double Ratchet, X3DH, MLS TreeKEM, Noise ephemeral handshakes, Olm (Matrix)// | ||
| 43 | |Metadata protection|//Hide sender, receiver, and communication patterns//|//Tor (Onion routing), Mixnets (Katzenpost / Nym), Dandelion++ (P2P routing privacy), Cover traffic schemes, Veilid routing obfuscation// | ||
| 44 | |Resilience|//Continue operating despite adversarial environments//|//Multipath routing (Tor bridges, libp2p relay), Censorship-resistant transports (Snowflake, Pluggable transports), DTN/BPSec, CRDT/replicated DHT storage (IPFS/Kademlia), Opportunistic mesh routing (Briar/Scuttlebutt), Veilid global overlay network// | ||
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